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ABSTRACT
The proliferation of surveillance cameras has greatly improved
the physical security of many security-critical properties in-
cluding buildings, stores, and homes. However, recent surveil-
lance camera looping attacks demonstrate new security threats—
adversaries can replay a seemingly benign video feed of a place
of interest while trespassing or stealing valuables without get-
ting caught. Unfortunately, such attacks are extremely difficult
to detect in real-time due to cost and implementation con-
straints. In this paper, we propose SurFi to detect these attacks
in real-time by utilizing commonly available Wi-Fi signals. In
particular, we leverage that channel state information (CSI)
from Wi-Fi signals also perceives human activities in the place
of interest in addition to surveillance cameras. SurFi processes
and correlates the live video feeds and the Wi-Fi CSI signals to
detect any mismatches that would identify the presence of the
surveillance camera looping attacks. SurFi does not require
the deployment of additional infrastructure because Wi-Fi
transceivers are easily found in the urban indoor environment.
We design and implement the SurFi system and evaluate its
effectiveness in detecting surveillance camera looping attacks.
Our evaluation demonstrates that SurFi effectively identifies
attacks with up to an attack detection accuracy of 98.8% and
0.1% false positive rate.
1 INTRODUCTION
Surveillance cameras are now everywhere. Big cities around
the world heavily rely on video surveillance to protect them-
selves from various threats. Naturally, video surveillance sys-
tems become attractive targets of attacks. Recent attacks demon-
strate surveillance camera looping techniques by launching
a software attack on the camera or tapping their Ethernet ca-
bles [4, 8]. Such new avenue of attacks can potentially enable
∗This is an extended version of the conference paper in the proceedings of ACM
WiSec 2019 with the same title. This is the author’s version of the work. It is
posted here for your personal use. Not for redistribution.
† Research done while working at National University of Singapore.
unauthorized access to a security-sensitive area or unautho-
rized activities (e.g., stealing valuables or breaking properties)
by replaying seemingly legitimate video feeds.
Unfortunately, mitigation against such attacks is surpris-
ingly challenging. First, many existing legacy surveillance cam-
eras have no proper end-to-end integrity protection and their
hardware replacement/upgrade would incur prohibitive costs.
Second, detecting replayed video feeds purely based on video
signal analysis is impractical because the surveillance cameras
would frequently capture nearly identical but authentic video
feeds (e.g., an empty corridor or jewelry shop), which would
incur too many false positives. Third, the deployment of ad-
ditional infrastructure for detection (e.g., LED lights blinking
in a predefined pattern) will require additional efforts such
as secret sharing which potentially introduces a new attack
surface.
In this paper, we try to answer the following question: Can
we utilize any auxiliary information from devices that are present
along with the surveillance cameras in the place of interest? To an-
swer this question, we investigate whether we can leverage
universally deployed Wi-Fi transceivers to effectively detect
replayed video feeds. This is based on the observation that co-
located devices, though different in sensing modalities, may
perceive the same events. In this work, we propose SurFi1,
which detects in real-time the video feed looping attacks by
comparing the video feeds with channel state information
(CSI) signals, that can be easily captured via commercial Wi-Fi
transceivers. Figure 1 exemplifies a scenario where an adver-
sary first loops a seemingly legitimate video feed of an untam-
pered vault, while he is actually breaking into the vault. SurFi
successfully detects this attack in real-time by comparing the
looped video feed with the Wi-Fi CSI signal.
Designing SurFi comes with difficult challenges due to sig-
nal comparison across the two different sensing modalities.
First, a direct signal comparison is impossible because signals
from heterogeneous sensing modalities (i.e., video and CSI
signals) are inherently semantically different. In particular, state-
of-the-art video processing (such as OpenPose [6]) results in
1SurFi stands for ‘Surveillance with Wi-Fi.’
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Figure 1: SurFi detects the surveillance camera looping attack by
comparing live video feed with Wi-Fi channel state information
(CSI) signal.
displacement of main body points (including head, elbow,
waist, and knees) while CSI signals are time-series samples of
received wireless symbols across different frequency bands.
Second, we cannot simply rely on machine learning classifica-
tion on CSI signals, unlike many research utilizing CSI signals
for activity recognition [1, 9, 17, 18]. This is because we can-
not expect to collect training data for all possible authorized
and unauthorized activities of arbitrary visitors of a place of
interest (e.g., a jewelry shop or a bank ATM office).
To address these main challenges, we propose to extract
common attributes from the time-frequency analysis of the
signals of differing sensor types. Particularly, we observe that
the two signals capture the common timing information of oc-
currence of activities and the corresponding main frequency
component. Furthermore, we evaluate our proposal with real-
world implementation and demonstrate that SurFi can detect
potential attacks (i.e., non-matching video and CSI pair) with
up to an attack detection accuracy (or true positive rate) of
98.8% and 0.1% false positive rate.
2 THREATMODEL
We first define a place of interest as an indoor, open space under
video surveillance. Some activities in the place of interest are
defined unauthorized (e.g., breaking/opening jewelry boxes
by unauthorized personnel, breaking/moving ATMmachines)
and the video surveillance system aims to identify such unau-
thorized activities. We also assume that the surveillance cam-
era’s field-of-view covers the entire place-of-interest. This is a
reasonable assumption because one installs the video surveil-
lance systems to protect valuable assets, hence purposely mini-
mizing blind spots (i.e., area not in the camera’s field-of-view).
In this paper, we consider the surveillance camera looping
attack, where an adversary is capable of replaying a seemingly
legitimate video feed (i.e., containing authorized activities
only) to trick the targeted surveillance monitoring system. The
ultimate goal of this attack is to evade the detection of the
adversary’s unauthorized activities by the authorities (e.g.,
security guards and personnel) as shown in Figure 1.
Recently, security researchers have demonstrated the feasi-
bility of such attacks. In BlackHat 2013 [8], researchers demon-
strated how a vulnerability in the web server interface of a
surveillance camera can be leveraged to replace the live video
feed with a legitimate-looking image such as an empty store
or a lift compartment. In DefCon 2015 [4], another group of re-
searchers demonstrated live video feed looping by hijacking an
Ethernet cable connection between a camera and a surveillance
system without breaking the physical connection.
Unlike the surveillance camera looping attack, there have
been no known CSI measurement looping attacks to date.
Hence, we assume that the adversaries cannot loop CSI mea-
surements.
3 SYSTEM DESIGN
We now describe how SurFi utilizes the Wi-Fi signal to ver-
ify whether the surveillance camera system is under attack.
Figure 2 depicts the flowchart diagram of SurFi’s design con-
sisting of four steps. SurFi continuously receives the real-time
video feeds from the surveillance cameras as well as the CSI
data from a Wi-Fi receiver. The two sets of signals are input
to the Data Pre-processing module. This module extracts the
displacement of body keypoints from the video feeds and re-
moves noise from the CSI signals (§3.1). Subsequently, SurFi
monitors the denoised CSI signals to detect the start of an
event (§3.2). On detecting the start of an event, the Attribute
Extractionmodule extracts three attributes (i.e., start time, end
time, and prominent frequency of an event) from both the
body keypoints and the denoised CSI signal (§3.3). Following
this, the Comparisonmodule compares the attributes and out-
puts the similarity score (§3.4). Finally, the Decision module
takes the similarity scores of multiple events and outputs the
final decision of whether the video is looped (§3.5).
3.1 Data Pre-processing Module
In this step, we pre-process the two raw signals obtained from
a Wi-Fi receiver and a surveillance camera.The raw CSI signal
is composed of multiple time-series CSI values in each sub-
carrier (e.g., 30 subcarrier per antenna pair in IEEE 802.11n).
We can reliably collect these signals by using various open
source tools [7, 15]. We denoise these raw CSI values in order
to reliably extract the attributes [18]. We reduce noise from
a wide frequency range of the received CSI values because
we do not have a pre-specified set of authorized and unautho-
rized human activities that may occur in a place of interest; i.e.,
an open space with public access such as ATMs and offices.
Hence, we utilize Discrete Wavelet Transform (DWT) filter,
which reduces the noise from all frequency bands available in
the raw CSI data (e.g., 1–500 Hz in our experiments) [1].
For the live video feeds, we use OpenPose [6], a state-of-
the-art real-time video processing tool, to detect the body key-
points in the video feeds. OpenPose returns the X-Y coordinates
of the 25 body keypoints per video frame. Figure 3 shows an
example of the body keypoints detected by OpenPose.
3.2 CSI Event Detector Module
The event detector module receives the denoised CSI values
and the X-Y coordinates of the 25 body keypoints, and checks
if a start of a new event is detected. This module monitors the
CSI values only because the video feeds can be manipulated
by the looping attacks. The start of an event is detected using
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Figure 2: Figure depicts a flowchart illustrating the five modules of SurFi. The Attribute Extraction Module extracts common attributes from
different sensing modalities (i.e., video and CSI). The computed scores are then compared in the Comparison Module, which in turn is input
to the Decision Module to output the final attack detection decision.
OpenPose
Input video feed Detected body keypoints
Figure 3: OpenPose extracts 25 body keypoints (including eyes,
hand, feet, joints) and outputs their X-Y coordinate in real time.
a metric referred to as motion energy [10], which is the energy
contained in the frequency bands of the CSI signals. When the
start of an event is detected, SurFi triggers the next attribute-
extraction module and provide it the denoised CSI values and
video keypoints until the end of the event is detected.
3.3 Attribute-Extraction Module
The two goals of the attribute-extraction module are (1) to
select a set of attributes that enable reliable comparison of the
two signals, and (2) to compute the attributes in real-time.
Requirements for reliable comparison. The first requirement
is that the attributes need to be captured consistently from both
the video and CSI signals. Fine-grained information retriev-
able from video signals (e.g., precise height or gait of a person)
may not be adequately extracted from CSI [18], and, thus, not
suitable for our purpose. The second requirement is that the
attributes should capture the distinctive characteristics (e.g.,
the frequency of repeated actions) of activities with acceptable
accuracy. One may argue that the accurate identification of in-
dividuals will increase the detection of looped video feed (e.g.,
the live video feed shows Alice whereas the CSI analysis iden-
tifies Bob). Although it may be useful, accurate identification
of human beings in a large population (more than 8-10 people)
based on the CSI signals remains an open problem [18, 19].
After extensive experiments under various environments,
activities, and human participants, we have found the three
attributes that satisfy the above requirements. The first two are
time-domain components and the last is a frequency-domain
component. The time-domain attributes are the start and end
time of an event whereas the frequency-domain attribute is the
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Figure 4: Time series of the video body keypoint and the selected
CSI subcarrier when a person moves his arm up and down. The
selected video keypoint is the left wrist and the selected CSI sub-
carrier is the one with the largest energy component.
prominent frequency. When extracting these attributes from the
pre-processed video and CSI signals, we choose a single time-
series component from each signal, as shown in Figure 4. That
is, we choose one keypoint with the maximum signal magni-
tude in the frequency domain from the processed video data,
which represents the largest displacement of a single body
component during the measurement period. Also, we choose
one subcarrier signal with the largest energy component from
the denoised CSI data. This simplification reduces the attribute
extraction and comparison to a single-dimension problem for
real-time analysis while effectively capturing major activities
performed in the place of interest.
Start and end time.We analyze the video and time-domain
CSI signals to investigate whether the start and the end time
of an activity or an event can be reliably captured. Figure 4
depicts an activity where a person moves his left arm up and
down for a random time duration, repeating it three times.
Note that similar video signals can be obtained from the
other body parts (e.g., the left elbow) but our algorithm picks
the left wrist as it contains the largest magnitude. Both signals
exhibit a similar start and end time, and this trend is consis-
tently observed over multiple trials, people, and events. This
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Figure 5: FFTprofile of the leftwrist bodykeypoint and the selected
CSI subcarrier when a person moves his arm up and down. The
prominent frequency of both the signals is 0.6 Hz, which is the fre-
quency at which the event is performed.
allows us to conclude that they can be the reliable attributes
for comparison between the video and CSI signals.
To extract the start and the end time of an event, we use a
metric referred asmotion energy [10] which captures the energy
in the different frequency bands of the CSI signal. The motion
energy (E) can be calculated as
E =
L∑
i=1
FFThal f (i)2, (1)
where the FFThal f (i) is the FFT coefficient magnitude calcu-
lated over a time window, L. Note that we only consider the
first half of the FFT coefficients since other half is redundant
and we ignore the DC component. We divide the total event
time window into L of 0.1 seconds for both video and CSI sig-
nals since this gives sufficient time granularity for comparison
of attributes.
We detect the start time of an event when its motion energy
E increases and crosses a threshold. For the video feeds, we
monitor the instantaneous E values and determine the start
of an event when E becomes ten times larger than its moving
average value. For CSI signals, which is still much noisier than
the video signals, we determine the start of an event when the
variance of E becomes larger than its moving average. The end
times can be calculated similarly. We denote the start and the
end times measured for an event from video and CSI signals
as follows: τ Vstart, τ
V
end, τ
C
start, and τ
C
end.
Prominent frequency. The third attribute we extract is the
prominent frequency component of an event. We observe that
it is possible to extract a single frequency component that
exhibits the maximum signal magnitude in the frequency do-
main. Figure 5 shows the FFT plot of the selected video and
CSI signals of the aforementioned activity discussed in Fig-
ure 4. We observe that both the video and CSI signals exhibit
approximately 0.6 Hz main frequency component. Hence, we
conclude that a repeated event is captured as the prominent
frequency component in the frequency domain.
To calculate the prominent frequency of an event, we first
apply FFT on the video signal and consider the frequency
with the maximummagnitude as the prominent frequency, f V.
Then, we apply a bandpass filter on the CSI signal with the fre-
quencywe obtain from the video signal f V to remove unrelated
frequency components (e.g., less than 0.3 Hz which mainly
captures slower movements such as posture changes [18]) and
extract the maximum magnitude frequency, f C.
3.4 Comparison Module
Given the two sets of attributes {τ Vstart, τ
V
end , f
V} and {τ Cstart,
τ Cend, f
C} from the video and CSI signals, we compute the simi-
larity score S(i) for a single observed event Event(i).
We first determine the per-attribute similarity scores between
the two signals as follows,
ASj =
{
1 if △j ≤ Tj
0 otherwise,
, j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, (2)
where Tj is the per-attribute threshold and △j is the difference
between the three attributes of the two signals as follows: △1
= |τ Vstart − τ Cstart |, △2 = |τ Vend − τ Cend |, and △3 = | f V − f C | . The
per-attribute thresholds are chosen empirically to obtain an
acceptable detection accuracy with a low false positive rate per
attribute. To achieve this, we compute the accuracy with which
each attribute detects a legitimate video as legitimate, and a
looped video as looped. A low threshold value may result in
misidentifying the legitimate video as looped, whereas a high
threshold value will cause the looped video to be incorrectly
detected as legitimate, thereby decreasing the accuracy. Thus,
the threshold at which the accuracy is maximized is selected as
the per-attribute threshold. Based on our experiments, we ob-
serve the start and end time attribute thresholds of 2.5 seconds
and 2 seconds, respectively, and a frequency attribute thresh-
old of 0.25 Hz to be optimal. Subsequently, we compute the
per-event similarity score, which ranges from 0 to 3 as follows,
S(i) =
3∑
j=1
ASj . (3)
3.5 Decision Module
The decision module takes as input the similarity scores of
one or more individually observed events and outputs a final
decision of whether the video feed is looped. When multiple
events are considered, detection accuracy (i.e., how effectively
SurFi detects when the video feed is looped) improves and
false positive rate (i.e., how frequently SurFi misidentifies a
legitimate case as an attack) decreases. This is because as more
similarity scores from independently observed events are con-
sidered, SurFi achieves higher confidence level for the final
decision. We first take the average of the similarity score of
multiple events and compare it against a decision threshold.
The choice of this threshold affects the detection accuracy and
the false positive rate. We decide to set a low false positive rate
for SurFi and then evaluate the detection accuracy.
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used for collecting CSI, and the three events we test.
4 EVALUATION
We evaluate the feasibility of SurFi by conducting preliminary
experiments in a controlled environment. We describe our
experiment setup and present the performance evaluation.
4.1 Experiment Setup
Figure 6 shows the setup of our place of interest. We set a
controlled experiment in a small indoor office room (4.9-meter
wide × 2.6-meter long) . We set up a transmitter-receiver pair
using two Thinkpad W500 laptops equipped with Intel NIC
5300, which are spaced 1.6-meter apart on the table. We use
Linux 802.11n CSI Tool [7] on Ubuntu 14.04 to extract CSI
values from Wi-Fi packets at 5 GHz frequency range. The
transmitter sends one ping packet every 1 millisecond and
the receiver collects the CSI values. Overall, we obtain the CSI
values of 90 subcarriers as the two laptops are equipped with
one transmitter and three receiver antennas.
For video feed collection,we record video clips (at 13-Megapixel
resolution at the 30 frames/second sampling rate) using a cam-
era on a mobile phone installed in the middle of the wall, with
the field-of-view that faces a participant.
We ask the participants to perform the following three events:
(E1) standing and moving the left arm up and down repeat-
edly at 0.6 Hz frequency;
(E2) sitting and thumping right fist on the table repeatedly
at 1 Hz frequency; and
(E3) sitting and clapping his/her hands repeatedly at 1.6 Hz
frequency.
In our experiments, we test the three events with four par-
ticipants and each event is tested 21 trials per participant. We
instruct the participants to perform the selected activity at
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Figure 7: The distribution of similarity scores of the three events for
the legitimate and attack cases. In the legitimate cases, we compare
a live video feed and the CSI signal of the same event. In the attack
cases, we instead use a looped video feedwith a different event. The
bars represent the average scores whereas the error bars denote the
standard deviations.
a certain frequency. To represent more realistic event occur-
rences, we randomize the starting and ending time of each
trial (chosen uniformly at random between 5 to 15 seconds
range, and 25 to 35 seconds range, respectively) such that each
trial length ranges from 10 to 30 seconds.
4.2 Attribute-based Similarity Comparison
We now evaluate how SurFi utilizes the three attributes to
compare similarities between the video and CSI signals, ul-
timately to detect for any potential attacks. Figure 7 depicts
the distribution of the per-event similarity scores S(i) of an
observed Event(i) for the legitimate and attack cases across
the three event types. For the legitimate cases, we compute
S(i) by comparing the attributes extracted from the live (thus
authentic) video feed and the CSI signal. Subsequently, we
treat the remaining cases as attack cases. Hence, for the attack
cases, we compute S(i) by comparing the attributes extracted
from the looped video feeds, which contain different event
types, and the CSI signal; e.g., E1 is performed in a looped
video feed while E2 is performed in the actual experiment.
Overall, we have 84 trials per event type (e.g., E1, E2, E3) rep-
resenting the legitimate cases and 14,112 trials per event type
representing the attack cases. The legitimate cases show much
higher average per-event similarity scores (i.e., 2.6, 2.5, and
2.8) than the attack cases (i.e., 0.81, 0.77 and 0.79). The clear
difference in the per-event similarity scores of the two cases
shows that the selected attributes can effectively differentiate
the cases independently of event types and subjects. Yet, their
high variance (e.g., often close to 1) may cause some incorrect
attack detection and false alarms.
4.3 Attack Detection Accuracy
We now evaluate the overall performance of SurFi when mul-
tiple events are observed within a short time duration (e.g.,
a few minutes) to increase the attack detection accuracy. We
define two performance metrics as follows:
(1) Attack detection accuracy (or true positive rate): a ratio that
the looped video feeds are correctly identified as looped;
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Figure 8: The attack detection accuracy improves as SurFi usesmore
events for attack detection.
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Figure 9: Cumulative distribution function (CDF) of legitimate and
attack cases for different numbers of events used for attack detec-
tion.
(2) False positive rate: a ratio that the legitimate video feeds is
incorrectly detected as looped.
We randomly append events together to emulate multiple
event sequence. We then take the average of per-event simi-
larity scores of the sequence. As discussed earlier, the more
events we observe and use to detect the attacks, the higher
confidence we have for our final decision, thus improving the
attack detection accuracy. Figure 8 shows the attack detection
accuracy of the SurFi’s attack detection for a different number
of events varying from 1 to 5 and different target false positive
rates (0.1% to 0.9%). We can observe that SurFi achieves 36%
detection accuracy with only a single event when we target
the false positive rate no higher than 0.1%. It can achieve up
to 98.8% detection accuracy when it uses five events for the
same target false positive rate. As the target false positive rate
increases, the detection accuracy further increases as depicted
in the figure.
Furthermore, Figure 9 explains why we can achieve higher
detection accuracy as we use more events for attack detection.
The figure shows the CDF of the similarity scores when the
number of events is 1 and 5. It can be observed that for both
legitimate and attack cases, the variance of the similarity score
distributions decreases as the number of events increases.
5 DISCUSSION
In this section, we discuss the potential improvements for
future work and some of the deployment considerations.
Stronger adversary model. One of the ways that an attacker
could defeat SurFi is to mimic a subject’s activities played in
the compromised video. However, the level of sophistication
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Figure 10: Behind-the-wall activity effects the CSI measurement
only when the receiver (RX) position is near the activity being per-
formed outside.
required for such an attack would be significant, as small dif-
ferences will cause differences in the attributes. Furthermore,
SurFi’s Decision Module requires the attacker to consistently
mimic multiple events in series, making circumventing the
SurFi defense even harder. We leave the study of more sophis-
ticated attacks for future work.
Behind-the-wall activities.One remaining concern is that the
SurFi’s performance may degrade (i.e., high false positives)
because of the activities outside the physical perimeter of our
place of interest. However, our simple experiments shows that
behind-the-wall activities are not detected as long as they are
far away from the receiver (e.g., 3.6-meter). We evaluate the
performance of SurFi by conducting experiments at varying
positions of the receiver. Figure 10 shows themotion energy cal-
culated from the CSI measurements for three different receiver
positions: receiver is at a distance of 5-meter (far), 3.6-meter
(middle), and 0.9-meter (near) from the corridor outside the
experiment room in Figure 6.
The plot clearly shows that for the receivers located in far and
middle positions, the behind-the-wall activities are not detected
since the corresponding motion energy is close to zero due
to signal attenuation of the wall. In contrast, for the receiver
located in the near position, the varying motion energy often
leads to false detection of an event. This is because the receiver
close to the corridor (e.g., 0.9-meter) can still measure the CSI
and detect the event even if the CSI signal suffers attenuation.
Deployment considerations. When the SurFi system is de-
ployed in practice, one may need to perform some calibrations
because some thresholds used in our attack detection (e.g.,
thresholds for per-attribute similarity scores in Section 3.4 or
multiple-event based decision in Section 3.5) should be ad-
justed to the new environment.
6 RELATEDWORK
This section presents related work on wireless sensing as well
as cross-modality sensing. Refer to Section 2 for the recent
work on video camera looping attacks.
Wireless Sensing.Many researchers demonstrate the feasibil-
ity of leveraging wireless signal (including Wi-Fi) for recogniz-
ing various human movements including human activity and
gesture recognition [1–3, 10, 13] as well as person identifica-
tion using gait patterns [16, 18, 19]. All of these research utilize
6
machine learning classification that requires the collection of
training data. While SurFi also utilizes the analysis of CSI sig-
nals, we address an inherently more challenging problem as
we cannot expect to collect training data. Bagci et al. [5] con-
siders the problem of physical tampering of the Wi-Fi enabled
cameras (e.g., moving or rotating the surveillance camera),
which is different from our problem.
Cross-modality Sensing. Recent body of work studies how to
utilize heterogeneous sensing modalities for added benefits.
Researchers correlate video camera image with other sensing
modalities such as RSSI value or IMU data to provide addi-
tional verification in different applications [11, 12, 14]. We are
inspired by these techniques but SurFi addresses an inherently
more difficult challenge of performing cross-modality correla-
tion without the need of deploying specific sensors on users
or objects, but rather utilizing the sensed information from
existing infrastructure.
7 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose SurFi, a system that detects surveil-
lance camera looping attack in real-time. SurFi leverages existing
Wi-Fi infrastructure (thus requiring no additional hardware
or deployment costs) to extract channel state information (CSI)
to process and correlate video and CSI signals to detect any
mismatches. SurFi increases its detection confidence as more
events are perceived and correlated by the two heterogeneous
sensing modalities. Our proof of concept of SurFi achieves up
to an attack detection accuracy of 98.8% and false positive rate
of 0.1%. As our future work, we plan to conduct more compre-
hensive experiments with diverse events and environments
against a more sophisticated adversary model.
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